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SUMMARY 
The sulfur-iodine process to make hydrogen by the thermochemical splitting of water is under 
active development as part of a U.S. Department of Energy program. An integrated lab scale 
system is currently being designed and built. The next planned stage of development is a pilot 
plant with a thermal input of about 500 kW, equivalent to about 30,000 standard liters per hour 
of hydrogen production. The sulfur-iodine process contains a variety of hazards, including 
temperatures up to 850 ºC and hazardous chemical species including SO2, H2SO4, HI, I2, and of 
course H2. The siting and design of a pilot plant must consider these and other hazards. This 
report presents an initial analysis of the hazards that might affect pilot plant design and should be 
considered in the initial planning.
The general hazards that have been identified include reactivity, flammability, toxicity, pressure, 
electrical hazards, and industrial hazards such as lifting and rotating equipment. Personnel 
exposure to these hazards could occur during normal operations, which includes not only running 
the process at the design conditions but also initial inventory loading, heatup, startup, shutdown, 
and system flushing before equipment maintenance. Because of the complexity and severity of 
the process, these ancillary operations are expected to be performed frequently. In addition, 
personnel could be exposed to the hazards during various abnormal situations which could 
include unplanned phase changes of liquids or solids, leaks of process fluids or cooling water 
into other process streams, unintentional introducion of foreign species into the process, and 
unexpected side reactions.
Design of a pilot plant will also be affected by various codes and regulations such as the 
International Building Code, the International Fire Code, various National Fire Protection 
Association Codes, and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. 
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1Initial Assessment of Sulfur-Iodine Process
Safety Issues and How They May Affect
Pilot Plant Design and Operation 
1. Introduction and objective 
The United States Department of Energy is funding development of a process to make 
hydrogen from water using heat from a nuclear reactor for energy1. The process uses 
three chemical reactions which, in total, give the desired net reaction. Because of the 
reagents involved, this process is known as the sulfur-iodine cycle: 
2 H2O + SO2 + I2Æ H2SO4 + 2 HI 
H2SO4 Æ H2O + SO2 + ½ O2
 2 HIÆ I2 + H2
These reactions operate at about 220, 850, and 400 ºC respectively and at moderate 
pressures below about 100 psig. The second reaction, decomposition of sulfuric acid, is 
endothermic (hence the use for nuclear heat) while the first and third are exothermic. 
However, in the expected process configuration the HI decomposition requires significant 
heating of the feed stream and is therefore a net energy consumer. In addition to these 
materials, concentrated H3PO4 solution is used after the first reaction to separate HI from 
unreacted H2O and I2. It too is recovered and recycled in the process. 
This document provides a preliminary evaluation of major safety and environmental 
issues that must be addressed as part of the design of a larger scale pilot plant, nominally 
about 500 kW thermal input or equivalent to production of about 30,000 standard liters of 
hydrogen per hour. It is largely based on a design described in a recent project milestone 
report2. Because maintenance and operations activities can be hazardous in ways that are 
distinct from process hazards, design issues which address them have also been included 
where they can be foreseen. This early guidance is provided to facilitate planning for the 
pilot plant, including selection of a building for it. A formal hazard assessment and 
design review must still be done when the designs are more developed.  
1J. M. Borgard et al.. High Efficiency Hydrogen Production from Nuclear Energy:Laboratory 
Demonstration of S-I Water-Splitting, International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative project final report 
2002-001-F, November 2005 
2 B. Russ et al., Conceptual Design for a 500 KW Sulfur-Iodine Thermochemical Cycle Pilot Scale 
Experiment, General Atomics, September 2005 
22. Process hazards 
The sulfur-iodine process contains a variety of potential hazards to equipment, personnel,  
and the environment. While most of these have been identified in the smaller integrated 
lab scale system now being designed and assembled3,4, the larger scale of a pilot plant 
adds other hazards. The complete list includes the following: 
x Reactivity – The product oxygen can accelerate or spontaneously initiate 
combustion of flammable materials. Sulfur trioxide and concentrated sulfuric acid 
are strong oxidizing agents which can react with other materials. Reactions that 
corrode the system piping will cause leaks of acids or toxic gases. 
x Flammability – The product hydrogen is quite flammable and can be detonable 
under certain conditions. Oxygen to burn it exists both in the process and in the 
outside atmosphere. 
x Toxicity – Most of the species in the process (H2SO4, SO2, SO3, HI, I2, H3PO4) are 
toxic, primarily with immediate destructive effects on tissue. 
x Thermal hazards – All parts of the process operate at temperatures sufficient to 
cause personal injury or fires if contact is not controlled. High temperature steam 
is a particularly severe burn hazard. 
x Pressure/kinetic energy – The system pressure and volume are not unusually 
large, so the kinetic energy hazard of accidental leaks or minor equipment 
breakage is not a major concern. Pressure relief will be needed in closed systems 
because of volume changes during solid-liquid and liquid-gas phase changes or 
thermal expansion of liquids over the expected temperature ranges. 
x Electrical hazards – The pilot scale process uses 500 kilowatts of thermal input 
supplied by electric heaters, which means that a substantial supply of electricity at 
high voltage will be available to the unit. 
x Industrial hazards – The scale of equipment will create lifting hazards during 
both installation and maintenance. Rotating equipment such as pumps will present 
hazards to fingers. Secondary containment used for pressure protection or toxic 
gas leak control creates issues for confined space entry. 
This preliminary review assumes that as the first step of controlling these hazards a self-
consistent set of design conditions will be used for the several process subsystems and 
that these subsystems will be built in accord with relevant mechanical or electrical design 
codes and standards. In addition, it anticipates the use of standard controls for the 
industrial hazards such as leak checks before operation, thermal insulation on exposed 
hot surfaces, and guards on rotating equipment.  
3 E. Parma, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Sulfuric Acid Section of the Integrated lab Scale 
Experiment, Sandia National Laboratories, June 2006. 
4 B. Wong, Safety Analysis for the Sulfur Iodine Integrated Laboratory-Scale Experiment, General Atomics 
report GA-C25485, June 2006. 
33. Hazards during normal operations 
The inventory of process hazards does not illustrate how an operator might come in 
contact with them. This section discusses some routine operations activities that could 
lead to personnel exposure or equipment damage but which can be addressed in the 
system design. Other exposure mechanisms will likely become evident as the layout, 
design, and planned activities are specified in more detail. 
3.1 Inventory handling and storage 
The flows of liquids through this process will be on the order of 200 L/hr, based on 
scaleup of the integrated lab scale system now under design with a hydrogen production 
rate of 200 standard liters per hour, or 1/150th the size proposed for the pilot plant. With 
intermediate storage tanks of eight hours capacity normally running half full, the 
inventory of process materials will be on the order of 800 liters (211 gallons) with 
weights of at least 1400 kg (3170 lb). This does not include materials held in storage for 
future use. This quantity of concentrated acids or solid iodine will require careful 
planning of the storage space to allow proper spill control and the loading equipment to 
assure operator safety during material handling.  
3.2 Thermal expansion during warmup or cooldown 
Because parts of the process run at temperatures near 400 and 900 ºC, thermal expansion 
during warmup must be carefully considered to prevent overstressing the piping or the 
vessels in the system. Depending on the operating procedures used, the thermal stresses 
during shutdown and cooldown may be different from those of warmup. The thermal 
stress consequences of sudden cooling from activating fire sprinklers over the unit while 
it is operating (perhaps because of a fire in unrelated equipment) must be considered.  
Because the relatively small scale of this system suggests that small diameter tubing will 
be sufficient to carry the flows, the normal flexibility of tubing systems will likely 
accommodate its full thermal expansion. This must be confirmed when the layout is 
finalized. Although a standard solution to large thermal expansions in piping is to install 
thin-walled expansion bellows, it may not be possible to fabricate these because any 
material of construction will likely carry a significant corrosion allowance. In the vessels 
of this system, the use of several materials of construction (especially corrosion-resistant 
glass liners inside a metal pressure-containing envelope) can present problems with 
differential thermal expansion within a single piece of equipment.  
3.3 Disposing of the product gases 
The oxygen and hydrogen produced by this process will require special handling. Oxygen 
likely can be vented directly into the atmosphere as long as the plume can be kept away 
from the air intakes of other combustion equipment including motor vehicles. The 
hydrogen will be more difficult because of the amount that must be handled: about 
30,000 liters/hour at standard conditions, equivalent to about 100 kW of heat if oxidized 
to water. Diluting this stream to less than 25% of the lower flammable limit will require 
about 1800 cubic feet per minute of air, an amount achievable with a ventilation blower. 
4Complicating either oxidation or dilution, however, the provisional hydrogen product 
contains 6 mol% HI vapor, or about 11.5 kg/hour. Routine discharge of this amount of HI 
is unlikely to be acceptable for environmental, process, or economic reasons. 
3.4 Byproduct and contaminant purging 
Though the feeds and products of the overall process are simple enough—water in, 
hydrogen and oxygen gases out—the implementation will require additional purge and 
waste streams. Liquid or solid contaminants such as feedstock impurities, corrosion 
products, or reaction byproducts have no purge route in the basic flow sheet unless one is 
added. Because there are three main recycle loops in the process (one each for SO2, I2,
and H3PO4), several purge points may be needed. These purges might be continuous or 
intermittent manual operations. Process purges would also be needed if a major upset 
alters the composition of streams or material stored between process sections in a way 
that prevents their reuse. Those materials will then have to be discarded. 
Because these purges and waste streams will contain hazardous process species, they will 
require either neutralization before they are disposed or special handling afterward. These 
operations create opportunities for inadvertent personnel exposure because they will not 
be routine. 
3.5 System shutdown 
In a normal shutdown the electrical power demand could be ramped down gradually. In a 
emergency shutdown triggered by operators or by the control system, it is likely that all 
the process heaters would be immediately depowered. Because they will total 600-800 
kW of design capacity to assure that they can deliver the specified 500 kW, the electrical 
system supplying this power could see a sudden large drop in load. The consequences of 
this for electrical system stability and on other equipment remaining on-line must be 
assessed. Fortunately, these heaters are resistive loads rather than inductive or capacitive 
loads which would create greater problems in a shutdown. 
3.6 System flushing 
Before the system can be opened for any type of maintenance, it will have to be flushed 
to remove the hazardous species and to cool the equipment. This will create a large 
volume of contaminated gas (air, nitrogen, or possibly steam) or liquid water, all of them 
containing acidic species. Because I2 is not soluble in water, the system might be 
designed to blow the liquid out of iodine-bearing lines with hot gas which would then 
contain significant volatile iodine. Any flush fluid will need to be treated before it can 
discharged since both the air and water must meet environmental discharge criteria. 
The piping should be designed to self-drain to the extent possible to intermediate storage 
vessels. Low point drains should be installed where liquid might be trapped during 
shutdowns, steam purging, or water flushing. These drains will be used to clear the lines 
before they are opened for maintenance or before the unit is restarted. They should be 
easily accessible even if the unit is hot. To avoid operator exposure to hazardous 
chemicals, these drains should be piped to a chemical sewer or to removable carboys. 
5In the event of a spill of process fluids from either piping drains or a vessel leak, the spill 
will have to be contained, collected, and treated. If the building where the system is 
located does not have an acid drain system already, a catch basin under each equipment 
item or built into the floor of each skid will be necessary. In cleaning up such a spill a 
large amount of rinse water requiring treatment would be generated. The floor drains 
under safety showers might also require collection for treatment before discharge. 
3.7 Equipment maintenance 
Because of the process’ complexity and severity, this pilot plant will likely require a large 
amount of mechanical and instrument maintenance. This work introduces the chance for 
accidents or injuries. Recognizing this before the detailed design is started allows the 
incorporation of several features to greatly simplify that work. 
x Locate equipment with foreseeable maintenance needs near the outside of the 
skids for access and avoid piping or structural interferences around these items. 
x Install permanent work platforms near elevated equipment that might need regular 
attention rather than relying on portable ladders for access. 
x Provide lifting lugs on heavy items that might be removed for maintenance, for 
instance pumps whose shafts or seals might corrode. 
x Assure overhead access for a bridge crane or portable crane to handle large and 
heavy equipment, and provide hoisting tie points or a beam-mounted trolley over 
moderate size equipment to allow the use of manual pulleys or winches. Provide a 
clear path to a lay-down area. 
x To simplify confined space entry issues, to the extent possible avoid installing 
maintained equipment in person-sized enclosures such as plastic-enclosed 
ventilated compartments or separate external pressure shells. 
x Provide flanged connections at equipment or piping that must be removed for 
maintenance. 
x The electrical power supply and the process chemicals both present hazards that 
must be locked-out before maintenance can be done on the unit. If it is not 
possible to lock-out the power to the process pumps, assure that lockable isolation 
valves are provided where needed. 
A potential larger-scale maintenance problem is that the many corrosive liquids and gases 
in the process could cause degradation of external systems if they leak even slowly. In 
particular, acid attack on vessel support structures or welds could lead to their failure and 
the collapse of part of the system. Similarly, attack on electrical insulation or barriers by 
corrosive vapors could lead to the unintentional electrification of parts of the system. 
Corrosion of process instruments could lead to failure to detect a hazardous situation. A 
program of regular visual inspection and instrumental monitoring to detect corrosion-
caused problems outside the process piping will be valuable in preventing this problem. 
64. Hazardous abnormal process conditions 
This section addresses situations which would significantly change the process conditions 
or operation from those expected in the design. While each is physically plausible, the 
current process detail is not sufficient to spell out how they might occur in this system. 
They might not be problems in practice. Assessing their hazard potential will require 
additional process information, expert review, or specific laboratory investigation. 
4.1 Phase changes 
Elemental iodine, a major component of several streams, has a relatively high melting 
point of 114 ºC. Sulfur trioxide’s melting point is similar at 63 ºC, and 100% H3PO4
melts at 42 ºC. At process conditions they will be liquids. During shutdowns, however, 
process equipment could cool to near ambient temperature and plug with the solid form 
of these materials, although blending with other process compounds will help by 
reducing the mixture melting points. Shutdown procedures that drain lines and vessels 
can limit the problem. However, preheating of these vessels and lines will be necessary to 
prevent freezing when these liquids are first reintroduced. While these materials can be 
allowed to freeze, this complicates restart because of the time to melt them. Plans to 
solidify and remelt iodine in piping or storage vessels must consider the consequences of 
its 25% volume increase upon melting. 
These high melting points will be especially significant in the design of pressure relief 
lines which must carry these streams for a long distance to a discharge point. A large 
mass of ambient temperature pipe downstream of the relief device could cause the fluid 
to freeze and restrict the relief line. This might not be noticed until the next time the relief 
device opens. Solids could also plug the inlet side of a relief device during normal 
operation if that stagnant section of piping is not purged or heat traced. 
A second phase change problem is associated with process streams that are liquids either 
at their boiling point or saturated with a gas. Sudden depressuring of such a stream can 
generate a large amount of a flashing two phase mixture, similar to opening a shaken can 
of soda. This situation risks carrying liquid where it is not expected or hindering the 
ability of a line or relief system to vent what was expected to be a single-phase fluid.
A related problem might occur in the sulfuric acid decomposition step where the initial 
process operation is to vaporize concentrated acid. This step is potentially subject to 
superheating the acid followed by sudden flashing of the mixture and carryover of liquid 
acid to the downstream equipment. Such flashing could occur when the vaporizer is 
restarted if it was not purged of deaerated process fluids during the previous shutdown. 
4.2 Unintended mixing of process fluids 
A leak of cooling water into a heat exchanger or misdirection of a water-containing 
stream into hot process equipment can create a sudden pressure surge when the water 
boils. Even if the destination equipment is not above the boiling point, adding water to a 
concentrated sulfuric or phosphoric acid stream creates a large exotherm from the heat of 
7solution. This can rapidly lead to local boiling and spattering. A leak like this into 
equipment that is valved shut might overpressure a vessel.  
Alternatively, a leak of almost any of the process fluids outwards into cooling water or 
other utilities lines creates a risk of personnel exposure to acidic fluids or hazardous gases 
where they are not expected, such as at a floor drain or a cooling tower. 
4.3 Introduction of foreign species 
There are several avenues for the introduction into this process of trace foreign species 
which could create problems. One group of trace species is those initially resident in the 
system when it is started or restarted. Air would introduce several compounds: nitrogen 
and argon, which should be inert and easily purged; oxygen, which will be purged too but 
which will require some safety considerations in the hydrogen loop; and carbon dioxide 
which, though present in air at less than 400 ppm and not being very soluble in either 
acidic or hot liquids, might in the presence of water and metal ions form insoluble 
bicarbonate or carbonate salts. Liquid water present from prior flushing with either cold 
water or steam could unexpectedly boil, raising the system pressure or pushing other 
liquids through piping. Another initial contaminant might be combustible materials such 
as pump or valve lubricants or improperly specified polymeric seals. Under the oxidizing 
conditions of this system, these organic materials could generate a small internal fire or 
cause coke formation. 
The second broad class of trace species are those introduced with the primary reactants. 
The water feed will undoubtedly be purified with reverse osmosis or other methods, but 
such systems can fail and the consequences must be planned for. Trace contaminants 
from this source might include ions such as sodium, calcium, magnesium, chloride, 
bicarbonate, or sulfate and dissolved gases such as air or chlorine dioxide from potable 
water disinfection. Other sources of trace species would be contaminants in the initial 
charges of H2SO4, SO2, I2, and H3PO4. These contaminants will depend on the source and 
purity of the reagents, but one that would be problematic is the possibility of trace 
chlorine in the iodine. Both of these elements are halogens with similar chemical 
behavior, so they might not be completely separated in an iodine purification process. 
Chloride ions can cause pitting or stress corrosion cracking in some materials at 
concentrations in the ppm range, especially at high temperatures and in systems where 
aqueous solutions are evaporated or boiled because dissolved chloride ions become 
increasingly concentrated in droplets that are evaporating.
4.4 Unexpected reaction products 
The S-I process’ severe conditions create the potential for unexpected reactions that are 
not part of the intended chemistry. These reactions might only occur during startup, 
shutdowns, or upsets when the process conditions are not at the normal flowsheet values. 
The resulting products, rather than the small amount of reaction that formed them, might 
lead to other problems. 
Corrosion of vessels and piping is the most evident set of secondary reactions. Even if 
there are purge points in the recycle loops for soluble corrosion products, metal ions will 
8still accumulate to some level and be carried around the loops. At the conditions 
elsewhere in the system they might either catalyze unwanted reactions or form solid 
precipitates that could plug lines, erode pumps and control valves, or foul heat exchange 
surfaces. Metal sulfates are one likely such precipitate. Under the oxidizing conditions of 
this process, such precipitates might also potentially contain metal peroxides or 
superoxides which would be reactive or explosive when dry. 
The sulfur and iodine which give this process its name each can have a variety of 
oxidation states. The formation of alternative sulfur or iodine species should be 
considered for the same reasons as corrosion products: accumulation in recycle loops, 
formation of solids, and potential reactivity issues. The possibility of forming elemental 
sulfur or H2S under some conditions has been recognized. Beyond this, the sulfur iodide 
cation S2I42+ is known to exist. The formation and further reaction of oxygenated species 
such as peroxysulfuric acid (HO-SO2-OOH) or HIO, HIO3, HIO4, or I2O5 (iodic acid 
anhydride) are other possibilities. These oxygen-iodine species may be highly reactive, 
based on the properties of the analogous chlorine species. Whether any of these could be 
formed at conditions in the S-I process, possibly during upsets or transients, is unknown. 
95. Facility limits on chemical inventories 
The hazards discussed earlier in this report would primarily affect people operating or 
visiting the unit. To protect the building itself or people (including emergency 
responders) who might might visit other parts of the facility, various national and 
international design codes establish design requirements for buildings containing hazards 
such as oxidizers or flammable gases. Typical requirements include fire-resistant walls, 
automatic sprinklers, or separation of incompatible activities. These codes also specify 
the amount of hazardous material that can be stored in a room or building at various 
levels of design protection. These limits are significant at the scale of an S-I pilot plant, 
and can possibly prevent installation of the pilot plant in an existing facility or might 
mandate significant changes to the interior of a new or modified facility. 
The International Building Code (IBC) defines a number of occupancy categories for 
rooms and buildings based on the activities in them and specifies features that must be 
present to allow each class of occupancy. The in-town research laboratories of the Idaho 
National Laboratory are generally group B (Business) occupancy, although particular 
areas such as flammable solvents storage in the chemical storage facility carry higher 
ratings. The limits for the major chemicals of the S-I process allowable under a non-high-
hazard classification are listed in Table 1. Though inventory requirements for a pilot plant 
can not be determined until the system is designed, the allowable storage inventories of 
sulfuric acid, sulfur dioxide, and iodine are all about a drum or less, comparable to what 
might be expected in a pilot plant. The 1000 pounds allowable for iodine seems large, but 
because it is a dense material with a specific gravity of about 5 the corresponding volume 
is relatively low. If these limits are exceeded, the building enters high-hazard group H-3 
for its inventory of “materials that readily support combustion or that pose a physical 
hazard”. It would be most practical to design the pilot plant area from the start for this 
occupancy to provide the most flexibility in future operations.  
The International Fire Code (IFC), updated in 2006, uses the same allowable inventories 
as the IBC values in Table 1. However, the IFC specifies building features that are 
oriented toward personnel safety rather than building protection. Separate chapters of that 
code address hazardous materials (those with physical hazards such as flammability and 
reactivity) and materials that toxic or highly toxic. The consequence for an S-I pilot plant 
is to reinforce the conclusion from the IBC that construction to a higher-than-basic 
occupancy class appears to be desirable if not strictly necessary.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) also promulgates related codes, with 
two pertaining to the chemicals of the S-I process: one for compressed gases [NFPA 55] 
and another for liquid and solid oxidizers [NFPA 430]. The latter code applies to the 
iodine and has limits for it of 100 tons in segregated storage. This is far beyond the 
expected inventories and presents no constraint. The compressed gas code, however, is 
much more restrictive because the compounds it covers, being gases, are far more mobile. 
The key limits are itemized in Table 2. 
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Table 1 Inventory limits on S-I chemicals under the International Building Code
Compound Hazard Category Maximum Allowable 
Quantity1, 2
Hazard 
Occupancy 
  In storage Used in closed 
system 
(if allowable 
is exceeded) 
Hydrogen Flammable gas 4,000 SCF 4,000 SCF H-2 
Oxygen Oxidizing gas 6,000 SCF 6,000 SCF H-3 
Sulfuric acid Water reactive 2  
Toxic
Corrosive 
200 lb 
2,000 lb 
2,000 gal 
100 lb 
1,000 lb 
1,000 gal 
H-3
Sulfur dioxide Corrosive 2,000 gal 1,000 gal  
Sulfur trioxide Oxidizing gas (liquefied) 
Toxic
(Highly Toxic)3
Corrosive 
60 gal 
2,000 lb 
(40 lb) 
2,000 gal 
6,000 SCF 
1,000 lb 
(20 lb) 
1,620 SCF
H-3
Iodine Oxidizer 2 
Corrosive 
1,000 lb 
20,000 lb 
500 lb 
2,000 gal 
H-3
Hydrogen iodide Corrosive 2,000 gal 1,000 gal  
Phosphoric acid Corrosive 2,000 gal 1,000 gal  
1 Total of all materials in this class. These limits assume use of approved storage cabinets and automatic 
sprinklers throughout the building. Materials are stored at ambient temperature but in pressurized cylinders 
or used at process conditions so the limits for the corresponding gas, liquid, or solid state are reported 
2 A compound with more than one maximum allowable quantity must adhere to the limits for all of them. 
3 One source indicated a hazard category of highly toxic rather than toxic for SO3
Table 2 NFPA limits on chemical inventories in sprinklered areas 
Material No enclosure 
(pilot plant area) 
Enclosure (storage) 
Flammable gas (H2) 2000 SCF 4000 SCF 
Oxidizing gas (O2) 3000 SCF 6000 SCF 
Liquefiable oxidizing gas (SO3) 3000 SCF as gas 60 gal as liquid 
Liquefiable corrosive gas (SO3, HI) 1620 SCF as gas 600 lb as liquid 
Liquefiable toxic gas (SO3) 1620 SCF as gas 600 lb as liquid 
Not surprisingly, the amounts acceptable by the NFPA code are similar to these accepted 
by the IBC and IFC. The hydrogen and oxygen limits are not problematic because those 
gases will be created in the process and then will promptly be separately vented to the 
atmosphere. The oxygen inventory will count against the allowable inventory of gaseous 
SO3 because both are oxidizing gases but this should not be a major limitation. Similarly, 
the limit for corrosive gases applies to the total of the two gases sulfur trioxide and 
hydrogen iodide (hydroiodic acid). Their limit as gases corresponds to the volume of 
about seven normal laboratory gas cylinders. 
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The Environmental Protection Agency also has regulatory requirements which depend on 
the amount of chemicals in a facility. Under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act the EPA has identified chemicals for which inventories above a 
specified Threshold Planning Quantity must be reported to the EPA as well as state and 
local emergency response personnel. The three S-I process chemicals on that list and their 
respective Threshold Planning Quantities are: sulfuric acid, 1000 lb; sulfur dioxide, 500 
lb; and sulfur trioxide, 100 lb. These amounts are comparable to the levels that might be 
expected in a pilot facility. Although the Right-to-Know Act creates notification and 
planning requirements, it does not impose specific design requirements on an S-I process 
pilot plant or the building housing it.
The conclusion from this overview is that when inventories of the chemicals in the S-I 
process reach amounts of a few hundred pounds, specific consequences for building 
design and environmental planning can result. Planning for pilot plant design must 
recognize the cost and schedule effects of this.
